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Nicomachean Ethics (Focus Philosophical Library series) by Aristotle. Read online, or download in secure PDF or secure ePub format. format; Title: Nicomachean Ethics; Series: Focus Philosophical Library; Author: Aristotle; Joe Sachs (ed.). Nicomachean ethics. [Aristotle; Joe Sachs] -- Focus Philosophical Library's edition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is a lucid and useful translation of one of. [Aristotle.; Joe Sachs] -- Focus Philosophical Library's edition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is a lucid and useful translation of one of Aristotle's Edition/Format: eBook: Document: EnglishView all editions and formats OverDrive (PDF).
The point of the remark is dear: that Aristotle was a philosopher is the single most important fact about him; all other biographical details, to say nothing of matters of mere happenstance, vanish in comparison. Yet students turning to Aristotle for the first time cannot know what it means to be a philosopher, and so it is probably worthwhile to learn something more about the man- if only as a first step on the long road to discovering for oneself what sort of a human being this "lover of wisdom" is, the "philosopher. The rough consensus is about as follows. The lecturer began his exposition as follows: 'As regards Aristotle himself, as regards the circumstances and the course of his life, suffice it to say: Aristotle was born, spent his life in philosophizing, and died:" Jacob Klein, ''Aristotle: An Introduction," in Lectures and Essays, ed. Robert B. John's College Press, r , p.
For Aristotle, he is courageous who endures right manner, and at the right time, and who displays confidence in a similar way. While the sphere of the former is everything that concerns a morally good man, the later deals with such things like honour, material goods, security, and its motive is the pleasure that comes from profit.
Temperance: Temperance is a mean between the extreme of self-indulgence and insensibility with respect to the desire for pleasures of the body eating, drinking, and sex. The licentious person feels not only excessive pleasure with regard to physical sensations, but also excessive pain when deprived of these pleasures. The temperate person will feel appropriate amounts of pleasure, and only toward those things that are conducive to health and fitness.
Prudence: prudence enters into the field of the moral virtues by pointing out the mean and suggesting ways of attaining it.
Prudence could be considered as the queen of the moral virtues. Without it, fortitude becomes harshness. It helps us to discern the 16 Ibid. But then, what is this right principle?
To answer this question, we go to the, we have to examine the intellectual virtues. As a matter of fact, Aristotle distinguishes between moral virtues, which we learn through habit and practice, and intellectual virtues, which we learn through instruction in the Nicomachean ethics.
The rational part can be further divided into a contemplative part, which studies the invariable truths of science and mathematics, and a practical part, which deals with the practical matters of human life. With the practical intellect, right reasoning corresponds to proper deliberation that leads to making the right choice.
There are five intellectual virtues by which the soul arrives at a truth, namely; i Scientific knowledge: This arrives at eternal truths by deduction or induction. Art, or technical skill, guides us in the correct manner of producing things. Prudence, or practical wisdom, guides us in the correct manner of action.
Further, a person who has phronesis practical or moral wisdom but does not have the right moral virtues will be very effective in devising means to personal ends, but those ends might not be noble. Without phronesis, the virtuous person would not necessarily know how to act, and without moral virtue, the clever person would not always pursue the appropriate ends.
While the intellectual virtues help us to know what is just and admirable, the moral virtues help us to do just and admirable deeds. Of what value then, are the intellectual virtues since knowledge is useless without action?
First, the intellectual virtues lead to happiness by helping us to make a right choice. Second, the intellectual virtues help us determine the best means to the ends at which the moral virtues teach us to aim. Without prudence and cleverness, a well- disposed person can never be truly virtuous, because these intellectual virtues help us grasp the right principles of action. Virtue requires doing the right thing for the right reason without serious internal opposition, as a matter of character.
This is, after all, just one implication of the thought that in an ethics of virtue it matters what kind of person you are. Of course, what it takes to develop your character in such a way that you are wholehearted about being generous, act fairly without regrets and so on, is a large matter. There is no single unified theory of our affective nature which all virtue theories share, and so there is a variety of views as to how we are to become virtuous, rather than merely doing the right thing for the right reason.
Samuel Stumpf, History and problem of philosophy New York: , p. Oesterle J. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by M. Disputed Questions on Virtue. Translated by Ralph McInerny. Indiana: St. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Benziger Bros. Aristotle, The Basic works of Aristotle. Edited by Richard Mckeon. New York: Random House Inc. Bentham, Jeremy. Hart and F. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Broadie Serah.
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Courage 3. Moderation 3. Liberality 4. Magnificence 4. And, in general, feelings seem to yield not to argument but to force. There must, therefore, somehow be a pre-existing character with some affinity for virtue through its fondness for what is noble and dislike of what is disgraceful.
For this reason, their upbringing and pursuits should be regulated by laws, because they will not find them painful once they have become accustomed to them.
Okay, so, he starts off by saying that nature is the main thing to ensure that one is capable of learning — but it is interesting that this alone is not enough. Nature is essential, but left on its own will not get you very far. The other is teaching, but teaching too may not help unless you have been prepared to hear the lesson — something Gramsci talks about at some length saying working class children need to be given discipline that they are unfamiliar with if they are to have any hope of succeeding in education.
What is stressed here is the development of habits and dispositions and that these are what allows the other two nature and teaching to be given any chance of success. Rather, even a mangy rabbit caught through the effort of the hunt will be worth more to the hunter than a dozen plump ones handed over without effort at the start of the day.