Cambridge Core - Military History - The Influence of Sea Power upon History, – - by A. T. Mahan. Frontmatter. pp i-ii. Access. PDF; Export citation. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, , published . The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: – is a history of naval warfare published in . "Geography, technology, and British naval strategy in the dreadnought era" (PDF). Naval War College Review. 59 (3): 89– ISSN
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The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, by A. T. Mahan. No cover available. Download; Bibrec. Title: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Author: A. T. Mahan. Release Date: September 26, [eBook #]. The influence of sea power upon history, by Alfred Thayer Mahan, , Little, Brown edition, - 12th ed.
For more information, please see the full notice. Mahan and some leading American politicians believed that these lessons could be applied to U. The s were marked by social and economic unrest throughout the United States, which culminated in the onset of an economic depression between and Mahan believed that the U. What concerned Mahan most was ensuring that the U. Government could guarantee access to these new international markets.
In fact, I've been finding that many of these "ancient" historical texts are far more enjoyable than some of their contemporary counterparts see my review of Henry Adams' History of the United States, Vols.
Mahan takes the reader on a whirlwind tour of the wars between the years and , focusin Despite being over a hundred years old, Mahan's classic text on the importance of sea power in wartime is both accessible to the modern reader and applicable to modern naval thinking. Mahan takes the reader on a whirlwind tour of the wars between the years and , focusing on the role that sea power played in all of them. Although some of these wars were mostly confined to the continent of Europe, Mahan makes a potent case that in all of them the control of the seas played a critical role in the outcome of those wars.
Mahan deftly shows through example how Louis XIV's designs for continental Europe were completely frustrated by England's control of the seas, which brought to England sources of revenue far in excess of her island-bound resources.
He spends the last pages going over the whole naval operations surrounding the American Revolution, looking at and extending beyond North America. As great as this book is, there are a two things that hold it back from a five-star rating. The first is his descriptions of actual naval battles.
It was difficult to piece together what was going on because of Mahan's extensive use of nautical terms such as "starboard tack," "leeward," "windward," etc. He did go over these in his introductory chapter, but briefly and not in a way that they would stick out in an average reader's mind. Thus, the naval battles are good for people with a knowledge of nautical terms and naval tactics, but not the average reader.
The other is his use of racial theories in his introductory chapter pointing out why certain countries fared better than others in terms of sea power.
While this was the prevalent theory of historiography during Mahan's era, it is still disgusting and disconcerting to the modern reader's ears. Just plug your nose and try to get through it quickly. All in all, this is a fine read on how naval superiority is critical to the success of nearly any country at war.
It was written for the purpose of changing American attitudes towards modernizing its Navy. Via President Theodore Roosevelt it did just that. This in turn launched both a navel construction war with Germany and fed British and European suspicions about German intentions. One book equals one world war is a lot to put on one author but this is an actual speculation by historian Barbara Tuchman.
I had been delaying the day when I would make a point of reading this seminal book. Having done so, I wonder if this is the right one. In the usually recap of Mahan famous book the major points in The Influence are that: 1. Mahan argues a point I think originally made by Napoleon; that control of the sea gives to possessor the advantage in their the ability to strike at times and places where an opponent is least able to defend from such an attack. A single major victory can determine who wins control of the sea and there by significantly increases their ability to win a larger war.
So important is this aspect of the theory that well into World War II the Japanese Imperial Navy was still seeking to draw the US Navy into what it hoped would be a single, large naval battle, the outcome would decide WWII and be fought along the theoretical lines of Mahan. In The Influence, Point I is far more nuanced.
Sea Control can be expressed in terms of control of what I was taught to call sea lines of communication. Or control can be close in shore in the forms Or Commercial blockade Or Commerce warfare Or Direct engagement with critical enemy land based holdings Islands, harbors, land lines of communications via embarked invasion troops.
Mahan argued for a universal principle of concentration of powerful ships in home waters and minimized strength in distant seas, while Fisher reversed Mahan by utilizing technological change to propose submarines for defense of home waters and mobile battle cruisers for protection of distant imperial interests.
The French at first adopted Mahan's theories. French naval doctrine in was dominated by Mahan's theory of sea power and therefore geared toward winning decisive battles and gaining mastery of the seas. But the course of World War I changed ideas about the place of the navy, as the refusal of the German fleet to engage in a decisive battle, the Dardanelles expedition of , the development of submarine warfare , and the organization of convoys all showed the navy's new role in combined operations with the army.
He reversed Mahan's theory that command of the sea precedes maritime communications and foresaw the enlarged roles of aircraft and submarines in naval warfare. Castex enlarged strategic theory to include nonmilitary factors policy, geography, coalitions, public opinion, and constraints and internal factors economy of force, offense and defense, communications, operational plans, morale, and command to conceive a general strategy to attain final victory.
Mahan's strategic theories continue to be influential into the 21st century, especially in the newly emerging naval powers India and China. Although Mahan's influence on foreign powers has been widely recognized, only in recent decades have scholars called attention to his role as significant in the growth of American overseas possessions, the rise of the new American navy, and the adoption of the strategic principles upon which it operated. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Dewey Decimal. Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and his Letters.
Naval Institute Press. Naval History — Books That Changed the World Rev. New York: Signet Classic.
Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet: American Seapower Comes of Age. The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Greenwood Press. The Journal of Military History. Kelly, "Militarism in a Global Age: From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: Naval War College Review.