You can download the pdf versions of these selected books onto your phone or any other device to support your human rights studies or work. Here are. sonality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamen- tal freedoms books.4 Textbook content may determine the educational. articles and book chapters about educating for human rights. org/english/ bodies/chr/special/docs/tvnovellas.info> at 20 October
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MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC), Graz. Layout .. conceptual framework of the book and was entrusted. PART 1: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS. AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT. The International Bill of Human. rights education, based on the human rights movements in India. The rationale . covered in the book includes the Right to Information. We are.
Related Entries 1. The General Idea of Human Rights This section attempts to explain the general idea of human rights by identifying four defining features. The goal is to answer the question of what human rights are with a description of the core concept rather than a list of specific rights. Two people can have the same general idea of human rights even though they disagree about which rights belong on a list of such rights and even about whether universal moral rights exist. The four-part explanation below attempts to cover all kinds of human rights including both moral and legal human rights and both old and new human rights e. The explanation anticipates, however, that particular kinds of human rights will have additional features. Starting with this general concept does not commit us to treating all kinds of human rights in a single unified theory see Buchanan for an argument that we should not attempt to theorize together universal moral rights and international legal human rights.
There are also emerging and secular forms of natural law theory that define human rights as derivative of the notion of universal human dignity. The UDHR included both economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights because it was based on the principle that the different rights could only successfully exist in combination: The ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his social, economic and cultural rights — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, This is held to be true because without civil and political rights the public cannot assert their economic, social and cultural rights.
Similarly, without livelihoods and a working society, the public cannot assert or make use of civil or political rights known as the full belly thesis Although accepted by the signaturies to the UDHR, most of them do not in practice give equal weight to the different types of rights. Western cultures have often given priority to civil and political rights, sometimes at the expense of economic and social rights such as the right to work, to education, health and housing.
For example, in the United States there is no universal access to healthcare free at the point of use. Similarly the ex Soviet bloc countries and Asian countries have tended to give priority to economic, social and cultural rights, but have often failed to provide civil and political rights.
Another categorization, offered by Karel Vasak , is that there are three generations of human rights : first-generation civil and political rights right to life and political participation , second-generation economic, social and cultural rights right to subsistence and third-generation solidarity rights right to peace, right to clean environment. Out of these generations, the third generation is the most debated and lacks both legal and political recognition.
This categorisation is at odds with the indivisibility of rights, as it implicitly states that some rights can exist without others. Prioritisation of rights for pragmatic reasons is however a widely accepted necessity. Human rights expert Philip Alston argues: If every possible human rights element is deemed to be essential or necessary, then nothing will be treated as though it is truly important.
The internationl community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. Data based on uncertain estimates.
The UDHR enshrines, by definition, rights that apply to all humans equally, whichever geographical location, state, race or culture they belong to.
Proponents of cultural relativism suggest that human rights are not all universal, and indeed conflict with some cultures and threaten their survival. Rights which are most often contested with relativistic arguments are the rights of women. For example, Female genital mutilation occurs in different cultures in Africa, Asia and South America.
It is not mandated by any religion, but has become a tradition in many cultures. It is considered a violation of women's and girl's rights by much of the international community, and is outlawed in some countries. Universalism has been described by some as cultural, economic or political imperialism.
The Universal Declaration seems to proceed on exactly this assumption see Morsink One problem with this view is that existence as good reasons seems a rather thin form of existence for human rights. But perhaps we can view this thinness as a practical rather than a theoretical problem, as something to be remedied by the formulation and enactment of legal norms.
The best form of existence for human rights would combine robust legal existence with the sort of moral existence that comes from widespread acceptance based on strong moral and practical reasons. Such justifications should also be capable of providing starting points for justifying a plausible list of specific rights on starting points and making the transition to specific rights see Nickel ; see also Section 3 Which Rights are Human Rights? Further, justifying international human rights is likely to require additional steps Buchanan These requirements make the construction of a good justification for human rights a daunting task.
Approaches to justification include grounding human rights in prudential reasons, practical reasons, moral rights Thomson , human well-being Sumner , Talbott , fundamental interests Beitz , human needs Miller , agency and autonomy Gewirth , Griffin dignity Gilabert , Kateb , Tasioulas , fairness Nickel , equality, and positive freedom Gould , Nussbaum , Sen Justifications can be based on just one of these types of reasons or they can be eclectic and appeal to several Tasioulas.
Grounding human rights in human agency and autonomy has had strong advocates in recent decades. For example, in Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application Alan Gewirth offered an agency-based justification for human rights. He argued that denying the value of successful agency and action is not an option for a human being; having a life requires regarding the indispensable conditions of agency and action as necessary goods.
Abstractly described, these conditions of successful agency are freedom and well-being. Having demanded that others respect her freedom and well-being, consistency requires her to recognize and respect the freedom and well-being of other persons.
Since all other agents are in exactly the same position as she is of needing freedom and well-being, consistency requires her to recognize and respect their claims to freedom and well-being. These two abstract rights work alone and together to generate equal specific human rights of familiar sorts Gewirth , , From a few hard-to-dispute facts and a principle of consistency he thinks we can derive two generic human rights—and from them, a list of more determinate rights.
Accordingly, the justifying generic function that Griffin assigns to human rights is protecting normative agency while taking account of practicalities. He thinks that tying all human rights to the single value of normative agency while taking account of practicalities is the best way to remedy this malady. Beyond this, Griffin takes human rights to include many rights in interpersonal morality.
Unfortunately, accepting and following this proposal is unlikely to yield effective barriers to proliferation or a sharp line between human rights and other moral norms.
Two philosophers who have developed political conceptions are discussed in this section, namely, John Rawls and Charles Beitz for helpful discussions of political conceptions and their alternatives see the collections of essays in Etinson and Maliks and Schaffer Advocates of political conceptions of human rights are often agnostic or skeptical about universal moral rights while rejecting wholesale moral skepticism and thinking possible the provision of sound normative justifications for the content, normativity, and roles of human rights for challenges to purely political views see Gilabert , Liao and Etinson , Sangiovanni , and Waldron John Rawls introduced the idea of a political conception of human rights in his book, The Law of Peoples Rawls The basic idea is that we can understand what human rights are and what their justification requires by identifying the main roles they play in some political sphere.
In The Law of Peoples this sphere is international relations and, secondarily, national politics. Rawls says that human rights are a special class of urgent rights. He seems to accept the definition of human rights given in Section 1 above. But Rawls was working on a narrower project than Gewirth and Griffin. The international human rights he was concerned with are also defined by their roles in helping define in various ways the normative structure of the global system.
They provide content to other normative concepts such as legitimacy, sovereignty, permissible intervention, and membership in good standing in the international community. According to Rawls the justificatory process for human rights is analogous to the one for principles of justice at the national level that he described in A Theory of Justice Rawls Instead of asking about the terms of cooperation that free and equal citizens would agree to under fair conditions, we ask about the terms of cooperation that free and equal peoples or countries would agree to under fair conditions.
These representatives are imagined to see the countries they represent as free rightfully independent and equal equally worthy of respect and fair treatment. Rawls holds that under these conditions these representatives will unanimously choose principles for the global order that include some basic human rights for further explanation of the global original position see the entries on John Rawls and original position.
Rawls advocated a limited list of human rights, one that leaves out many fundamental freedoms, rights of political participation, and equality rights. He did this for two reasons. One is that he wanted a list that is plausible for all reasonable countries, not just liberal democracies. The second reason is that he viewed serious violations of human rights as triggering permissible intervention by other countries, and only the most important rights can play this role. Leaving out protections for equality and democracy is a high price to pay for assigning human rights the role of making international intervention permissible when they are seriously violated.
To accept the idea that countries engaging in massive violations of the most important human rights are not to be tolerated we do not need to follow Rawls in equating international human rights with a heavily-pruned list. Instead we can work up a view—which is needed for other purposes anyway—of which human rights are the weightiest and then assign the intervention-permitting role to this subset.
Like Rawls, Beitz deals with human rights only as they have developed in contemporary international human rights practice. The focus is not on what human rights are at some deep philosophical level; it is rather on how they work by guiding actions within a recently emerged and still evolving discursive practice.
The norms of the practice guide the interpretation and application of human rights, the appropriateness of criticism in terms of human rights, adjudication in human rights courts, and—perhaps most importantly—responding to serious violations of human rights. He accepts that the requirements of human rights are weaker than the requirements of social justice at the national level, but denies that human rights are minimal or highly modest in other respects.
Beitz rightly suggests that a reasonable person can accept and use the idea of human rights without accepting any particular view about their foundations. It is less clear that he is right in suggesting that good justifications of human rights should avoid as far as possible controversial assumptions about religion, metaphysics, ideology, and intrinsic value see the entry public reason. Beitz emphasizes the practical good that human rights do, not their grounds in some underlying moral reality.
This helps make human rights attractive to people from around the world with their diverse religious and philosophical traditions. Which Rights are Human Rights?
This section discusses the question of which rights belong on lists of human rights. A seventh category, minority and group rights, has been created by subsequent treaties. These rights protect women, racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, children, migrant workers, and the disabled. Not every question of social justice or wise governance is a human rights issue.
For example, a country could have too many lawyers or inadequate provision for graduate-level education without violating any human rights. Deciding which norms should be counted as human rights is a matter of considerable difficulty. And there is continuing pressure to expand lists of human rights to include new areas. Many political movements would like to see their main concerns categorized as matters of human rights, since this would publicize, promote, and legitimize their concerns at the international level.
One way to avoid rights inflation is to follow Cranston in insisting that human rights only deal with extremely important goods, protections, and freedoms. A supplementary approach is to impose several justificatory tests for specific human rights. This approach restrains rights inflation with several tests, not just one master test. In deciding which specific rights are human rights it is possible to make either too little or too much of international documents such as the Universal Declaration and the European Convention.
One makes too little of them by proceeding as if drawing up a list of important rights were a new question, never before addressed, and as if there were no practical wisdom to be found in the choices of rights that went into the historic documents. And one makes too much of them by presuming that those documents tell us everything we need to know about human rights.
There is little reason to take international diplomats as the most authoritative guides to which human rights there are. The treaty may suggest that the right is supported by weighty considerations, but it cannot make this so.
If an international treaty enacted a right to visit national parks without charge as a human right, the ratification of that treaty would make free access to national parks a human right within international law. But it would not be able to make us believe that the right to visit national parks without charge was sufficiently important to be a real human right see Luban These rights are familiar from historic bills of rights such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and the U.
Bill of Rights , with subsequent amendments. Some representative formulations follow: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression.
American Convention on Human Rights, Article Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.
Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his country. Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in strict equality of all persons before the law African Charter, Article Most civil and political rights are not absolute—they can in some cases be overridden by other considerations. For example, the right to freedom of movement can be restricted by public and private property rights, by restraining orders related to domestic violence, and by legal punishments.
Further, after a disaster such as a hurricane or earthquake free movement is often appropriately suspended to keep out the curious, permit access of emergency vehicles and equipment, and prevent looting. But it excludes some rights from suspension including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of ex post facto criminal laws, and freedom of thought and religion. Their inclusion has been the source of much controversy see Beetham The European Convention did not include them although it was later amended to include the right to education.
Instead they were put into a separate treaty, the European Social Charter. When the United Nations began the process of putting the rights of the Universal Declaration into international law, it followed the same pattern by treating economic and social standards in a treaty separate from the one dealing with civil and political rights.
Article 2. The contrast between these two levels of commitment has led some people to suspect that economic and social rights are really just valuable goals. Why did the Social Covenant opt for progressive implementation and thereby treat its rights as being somewhat like goals? For many countries, noncompliance due to inability would have been certain if these standards had been treated as immediately binding. Social rights have often been defended with linkage arguments that show the support they provide to adequate realization of civil and political rights.
This approach was first developed philosophically by Henry Shue Shue ; see also Nickel and Linkage arguments defend controversial rights by showing the indispensable or highly useful support they provide to uncontroversial rights. Lack of education is frequently a barrier to the realization of civil and political rights because uneducated people often do not know what rights they have and what they can do to use and defend them.
Lack of education is also a common barrier to democratic participation. Education and a minimum income make it easier for people near the bottom economically to follow politics, participate in political campaigns, and to spend the time and money needed to go to the polls and vote. Do social rights yield a sufficient commitment to equality?
Objections to social rights as human rights have come from both the political right and the political left. A common objection from the left, including liberal egalitarians and socialists, is that social rights as enumerated in human rights documents and treaties provide too weak of a commitment to material equality Moyn ; Gilabert Realizing social rights requires a state that ensures to everyone an adequate minimum of resources in some key areas but that does not necessarily have strong commitments to equality of opportunity, to strong redistributive taxation, and to ceilings on wealth see the entries equality , equality of opportunity , distributive justice , and liberal feminism.
The egalitarian objection cannot be that human rights documents and treaties showed no concern for people living in poverty and misery. That would be wildly false. One of the main purposes of including social rights in human rights documents and treaties was to promote serious efforts to combat poverty, lack of education, and unhealthy living conditions in countries all around the world see also Langford on the UN Millenium Development Goals.
The objection also cannot be that human rights facilitated the hollowing out of systems of welfare rights in many developed countries that occurred after Those cuts in welfare programs were often in violation of the requirements of adequately realizing social rights. Perhaps it should be conceded that human rights documents and treaties have not said enough about positive measures to promote equal opportunity in education and work.
A positive right to equal opportunity, like the one Rawls proposed, would require countries to take serious measures to reduce disparities between the opportunities effectively available to children of high-income and low-income parents Rawls A strongly egalitarian political program is best pursued partially within but mostly beyond the human rights framework.
One reason for this is that the human rights movement will have better future prospects for acceptance and realization if it has widespread political support.
That requires that the rights it endorses appeal to people with a variety of political views ranging from center-left to center-right.
Support from the broad political center will not emerge and survive if the human rights platform is perceived as mostly a leftist program. Do social rights protect sufficiently important human interests? Maurice Cranston opposed social rights by suggesting that social rights are mainly concerned with matters such as holidays with pay that are not matters of deep and universal human interests Cranston , Treatments of objections to social rights include Beetham ; Howard ; and Nickel It is far from the case, however, that most social rights pertain only to superficial interests.
Consider two examples: the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to free public education. These rights require governments to try to remedy widespread and serious evils such as severe poverty, starvation and malnutrition, and ignorance. The importance of food and other basic material conditions of life is easy to show. Without adequate access to these goods, interests in life, health, and liberty are endangered and serious illness and death are probable.
Are social rights too burdensome?
Another objection to social rights is that they are too burdensome on their dutybearers. It is very expensive to guarantee to everyone basic education and minimal material conditions of life. Frequently the claim that social rights are too burdensome uses other, less controversial human rights as a standard of comparison, and suggests that social rights are substantially more burdensome or expensive than liberty rights. Suppose that we use as a basis of comparison liberty rights such as freedom of communication, association, and movement.
These rights require both respect and protection from governments. And people cannot be adequately protected in their enjoyment of liberties such as these unless they also have security and due process rights. The costs of liberty, as it were, include the costs of law and criminal justice. Once we see this, liberty rights start to look a lot more costly. Further, we should not generally think of social rights as simply giving everyone a free supply of the goods they protect.
Guarantees of things like food and housing will be intolerably expensive and will undermine productivity if everyone simply receives a free supply. A viable system of social rights will require most people to provide these goods for themselves and their families through work as long as they are given the necessary opportunities, education, and infrastructure.
Note that education is often an exception to this since many countries provide free public education irrespective of ability to pay. Countries that do not accept and implement social rights still have to bear somehow the costs of providing for the needy since these countries—particularly if they recognize democratic rights of political participation—are unlikely to find it tolerable to allow sizeable parts of the population to starve and be homeless.
If government does not supply food, clothing, and shelter to those unable to provide for themselves, then families, friends, and communities will have to shoulder this burden. It is only in the last hundred or so years that government-sponsored social rights have taken over a substantial part of the burden of providing for the needy.
The taxes associated with social rights are partial replacements for other burdensome duties, namely the duties of families and communities to provide adequate care for the unemployed, sick, disabled, and aged. Deciding whether to implement social rights is not a matter of deciding whether to bear such burdens, but rather of deciding whether to continue with total reliance on a system of informal provision that distributes assistance in a very spotty way and whose costs fall very unevenly on families, friends, and communities.
Are social rights feasible worldwide? Another objection to social rights alleges that they are not feasible in many countries on how to understand feasibility see Gilabert Many governments will be unable to provide these guarantees while meeting other important responsibilities.
Rights are not magical sources of supply Holmes and Sunstein As we saw earlier, the Social Covenant dealt with the issue of feasibility by calling for progressive implementation, that is, implementation as financial and other resources permit. Does this view of implementation turn social rights into high-priority goals? And if so, is that a bad thing? Standards that outrun the abilities of many of their addressees are good candidates for treatment as goals. Viewing them as largely aspirational rather than as imposing immediate duties avoids problems of inability-based noncompliance.
One may worry, however, that this is too much of a demotion for social rights because goals seem much weaker than rights. But goals can be formulated in ways that make them more like rights. They can be assigned addressees the parties who are to pursue the goal , beneficiaries, scopes that define the objective to be pursued, and a high level of priority see Langford and Nickel ; see also UN Human Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals.
Strong reasons for the importance of these goals can be provided. And supervisory bodies can monitor levels of progress and pressure low-performing addressees to attend to and work on their goals. Treating very demanding rights as goals has several advantages. One is that proposed goals that greatly exceed our abilities are not so farcical as proposed duties that do so. Creating grand lists of social rights that many countries cannot presently realize seems farcical to many people.
Goals coexist easily with low levels of ability to achieve them. Another advantage is that goals are flexible: addressees with different levels of ability can choose ways of pursuing the goals that suit their circumstances and means.
Because of these attractions it may be worth exploring sophisticated ways to transform very demanding human rights into goals. The transformation may be full or partial. It is possible to create right-goal mixtures that contain some mandatory elements and that therefore seem more like real rights see Brems A right-goal mixture might include some rights-like goals, some mandatory steps to be taken immediately, and duties to realize the rights-like goals as quickly as possible.
Human rights documents repeatedly emphasize that all people, including women and members of minority ethnic and religious groups, have equal human rights and should be able to enjoy them without discrimination. The right to freedom from discrimination figures prominently in the Universal Declaration and subsequent treaties.
A number of standard individual rights are especially important to ethnic and religious minorities, including rights to freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom from discrimination.
Human rights documents also include rights that refer to minorities explicitly and give them special protections. For example, issues like domestic violence, reproductive choice, and trafficking of women and girls for sex work did not have a prominent place in early human rights documents and treaties. This has meant that governments cannot be seen as the only addressees of human rights and that the right to privacy of home and family needs qualifications to allow police to protect women within the home.
The issue of how formulations of human rights should respond to variations in the sorts of risks and dangers that different people face is difficult and arises not just in relation to gender but also in relation to age, profession, political affiliation, religion, and personal interests. Due process rights, for example, are much more useful to young people and particularly young men than they are to older people since the latter are far less likely to run afoul of the criminal law.
Since the United Nations has mainly dealt with the rights of women and minorities through specialized treaties such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ; the Convention on the Rights of the Child , and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities See also the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Specialized treaties allow international norms to address unique problems of particular groups such as assistance and care during pregnancy and childbearing in the case of women, custody issues in the case of children, and the loss of historic territories by indigenous peoples.
Minority groups are often targets of violence. Human rights norms call upon governments to refrain from such violence and to provide protections against it. This work is partly done by the right to life, which is a standard individual right. It is also done by the right against genocide which protects some groups from attempts to destroy or decimate them. The right against genocide is clearly a group right.
It is held by both individuals and groups and provides protection to groups as groups. It is largely negative in the sense that it requires governments and other agencies to refrain from destroying groups; but it also requires that legal and other protections against genocide be created at the national level.
Can the right against genocide be a human right? More generally, can a group right fit the general idea of human rights proposed earlier? On that conception, human rights are rights of all persons. Perhaps it can, however, if we broaden our conception of who can hold human rights to include important groups that people form and cherish see the entry on group rights. This can be made more palatable, perhaps, by recognizing that the beneficiaries of the right against genocide are individual humans who enjoy greater security against attempts to destroy the group to which they belong Kymlicka Consider environmental rights, which are often defined to include rights of animals or even of nature itself see the entry on environmental ethics.
Alternative formulations are possible, however. A basic environmental human right can be understood as requiring maintenance and restoration of an environment that is safe for human life and health. Many countries have environmental rights of this sort in their constitutional bills of rights Hayward A justification for a human right to a safe environment should show that environmental problems pose serious threats to fundamental human interests, values, or norms; that governments may appropriately be burdened with the responsibility of protecting people against these threats; and that most governments actually have the ability to do this.
One approach, advocated by Steve Vanderheiden accepts the idea of a human right to an environment that is adequate for human life and health and derives from this broad right a more specific right to a stable climate Vanderheiden Another approach, advocated by Simon Caney, does not require introducing a new environmental right. One could expand this approach by arguing that severe climate change should be reduced and mitigated because it will cause massive human migrations and other crises that will undermine the abilities of many governments to uphold human rights for evaluation of these arguments see Bell Universal Human Rights in a World of Diverse Beliefs and Practices Two familiar philosophical worries about human rights are that they are based on moral beliefs that are culturally relative and that their creation and advocacy involves ethnocentrism.
Human rights prescribe universal standards in areas such as security, law enforcement, equality, political participation, and education. The peoples and countries of planet Earth are, however, enormously varied in their practices, traditions, religions, and levels of economic and political development.
The anthropologist William G. Relativists sometimes accuse human rights advocates of ethnocentrism, arrogance, and cultural imperialism Talbott Ethnocentrism can lead to arrogance and intolerance in dealings with other countries, ethical systems, and religions.
Finally, cultural imperialism occurs when the economically, technologically, and militarily strongest countries impose their beliefs, values, and institutions on the rest of the world. Relativists often combine these charges with a prescription, namely that tolerance of varied practices and traditions ought to be instilled and practiced through measures that include extended learning about other cultures.
The conflict between relativists and human rights advocates may be partially based on differences in their underlying philosophical beliefs, particularly in metaethics. Relativists are often subjectivists or noncognitivists and think of morality as entirely socially constructed and transmitted.
In contrast, philosophically-inclined human rights advocates are more likely to adhere to or presuppose cognitivism, moral realism , and intuitionism. This is not, of course, the stance of most anthropologists today. Currently the American Anthropological Association has a Committee on Human Rights whose objectives include promoting and protecting human rights and developing an anthropological perspective on human rights.
While still emphasizing the importance of cultural differences, anthropologists now often support cultural survival and the protection of vulnerable cultures, non-discrimination, and the rights and land claims of indigenous peoples. The idea that relativism and exposure to other cultures promote tolerance may be correct from a psychological perspective. People who are sensitive to differences in beliefs, practices, and traditions, and who are suspicious of the grounds for extending norms across borders, may be more inclined to be tolerant of other countries and peoples than those who believe in an objective universal morality.
Still, philosophers have been generally critical of attempts to argue from relativism to a prescription of tolerance Talbott If the culture and religion of one country has long fostered intolerant attitudes and practices, and if its citizens and officials act intolerantly towards people from other countries, they are simply following their own traditions and cultural norms.
They are just doing what relativists think people mostly do. Accordingly, a relativist from a tolerant country will be hard-pressed to find a basis for criticizing the citizens and officials of the intolerant country. To do so the relativist will have to endorse a transcultural principle of tolerance and to advocate as an outsider cultural change in the direction of greater tolerance.
Because of this, relativists who are deeply committed to tolerance may find themselves attracted to a qualified commitment to human rights. East Asia is the region of the world that participates least in the international human rights system—even though some important East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea do participate.